Administrative Reforms official
attempts aimed at restructuring or reorganising the existing governmental
structure and its mode of functioning. The system of administration that
Bangladesh inherited at independence was basically of a colonial nature and had
been handed down to Pakistan by the British following the partition of India in
1947. The government of Pakistan seemed to have tried half-heartedly to
overhaul it and to do away with the colonial legacy. What resulted was 'brown
shahibs substituted for white ones'. Administrative reforms since Bangladesh's
independence appear to be a veritable obsession of every successive government.
Managing public affairs without resorting to administrative reform entails a
total disregard of efficiency, public opinion and internal cohesion. It was
evident that the primary obstacles to development of a new nation were
administrative, political, and economic bottlenecks. In order to streamline an
age-old and anachronistic administrative structure that was totally unsuitable
to meet the rising expectations of the people, the government has appointed
several major administrative reform commissions/committees since independence.
The problem faced by the government immediately after liberation
was to restore the civil administration and to transform the existing
provincial administration into a central one. In order to face this challenge,
the government formed the Civil Administration Restoration Committee to examine
and suggest ways and means for restoration of civil administration at various
levels as well as for absorption of officials and employees of the
ministries/departments of the former central government of united Pakistan. The
committee submitted its interim report on 4 January 1972, pending detailed
examination of the various issues relating to administration to be considered
by another committee appointed by the prime minister. In keeping with its
recommendations, the provincial secretariat was transformed into the national secretariat
with 20 ministries and related directorates/departments and corporations. In
the first term of the awami league rule (1972-75), the
government appointed two major committees in 1972, namely the administrative
and services reorganisation committee (ASRC) and the National Pay
Commission (NPC). The committee/ commission was entrusted with the
responsibility of suggesting measures towards reorganising the central
bureaucracy, including local government, accompanied by devolution of power
from the central to the local level and a national pay structure.
The ASRC found that the existing administrative/ service
structure was divided into too many entities which had artificial walls built
around them with varying career prospects, and a lack of professionalism. They
also found the structure to be too class-and-rank oriented with very little
opportunities for recruits to rise to the top, particularly those who had
started their career at the lower ranks.
Having considered the objective conditions of the civil
services, the ASRC recommended a single classless grading structure covering
all services into 10 grades in which there would be an appropriate number of
pay levels of skills and responsibilities and the correct grading for each post
would be determined by an analysis of the job.
The main theme of the recommendations was the abolition of
the elite cadre and no reservation of any post for any cadre; there would be
adequate opportunities for talented persons to rise quickly to the top from any
level of the service; there would be provisions for systematic re-exposure of
senior officers serving at the national headquarters to the field; and towards
the establishment of fellowship of officers with the common man.
The committee also argued strongly for the democratisation
of administration at all levels. It called for increasing devolution of
authority to the elected local government and clearly delineated the areas of
responsibility between the national government and local bodies. The ASRC held
the view that there should not be any fixity or rigidity in the devolution of
functions from the national government to the local bodies. The guiding
principle was that the local body should administer such services which it
could administer effectively. The committee held the view that the thana should
be the basic unit of administration and should assume all responsibilities of
development administration at that level. It also underscored the need for
converting sub-divisions into districts in a planned way. The far-reaching
recommendations of the ASRC made no impact on the government and remained
shelved as classified documents, as was the case with the previous ones during
Pakistani rule. Some politico-administrative analysts are of the opinion that
the reasons underlying the scrapping of the ASRC report were socio-economic and
political compulsions of the regime in power.
The NPC worked in close cooperation with ASRC and dealt with
a number of variables, such as cost of living, governmental resources, existing
pay disparities, attraction and retention of specialists and achievement of
efficiency, equity and work incentives in order to formulate a pragmatic pay policy.
The NPC felt that a nine-tier administrative structure with corresponding pay
scales could adequately meet the requirements of the Bangladesh bureaucracy for
the following five years. But the NPC's view was not accepted and the
commission was obliged to suggest pay scales on the basis of tiers and
groupings suggested by ASRC. The NPC eventually recommended a national pay
scale consisting of 10 grades. However, this was only partially implemented and
that too for only 3 years. The non-implementation of the NPC recommendations
was ascribed to the inherent defects of the reform itself and resistance of
generalist civil servants, particularly those belonging to the erstwhile CSP
and EPCS cadres.
After the fall of the Awami League (AL) government, the
succeeding military regime spearheaded by General Ziaur Rahman appointed a
committee known as the Pay and Service Commission (P & SC) in 1976 to
conduct a fresh inquiry into the services and pay structure and to suggest
necessary reforms. The commission held the view that the ingrained generalist
vs. specialist controversy could be resolved by bringing a fundamental change
in the staffing positions and providing a uniform pattern of pay scales and
promotions. The commission also argued that a large generalist cadre should not
be created by reservation of many posts and on the basis of a single
examination. The most important recommendations of the P & SC with regard
to services/central bureaucratic structure were the amalgamation of all
erstwhile services and thereafter the creation of an all-purpose civil service
to include all functions within the traditional government sector; emphasis on
the merit principle as the determining factor in recruitment and promotion;
removal of existing barriers between the CSP and other services through the
introduction of equal initial pay scales and provisions for equitable scope of
advancement in the administrative hierarchy. Initially the government seemed to
be hesitant in implementing the recommendations. However, two years later the
government implemented some of the recommendations of P & SC albeit in
modified form resulting in the creation of 28 cadres of Bangladesh Civil
Service (BCS), constitution of the Senior Services Pool (SSP), and the
introduction of new national grades and pay scales.
The special feature of the recommended civil service
structure was the creation of SSP in order to ensure representation from all
cadres at the decision-making level of the government. Most importantly, the
new civil service structure was designed to create a classless bureaucracy to
end the supremacy of one class over the other. But at the implementation stage,
there was improper/irregular application of procedure in the induction of SSP
members. After more than a decade of operation the SSP was abolished in 1989 on
the ground that it had failed to provide adequate promotion opportunities to
different cadre officials in the top positions.
To implement the recommended pay structure the government
asked the Finance Ministry's Implementation Division to draw up a revised pay
plan which would not have either too few scales or too many (as recommended by
P & SC). Consequently, the Implementation Division came up with pay plan
which was a compromise between the two. By Services (Grade, Pay and Allowances)
Order issued in 1977 the Ministry of Finance introduced 21 grades and scales of
pay for public sector employees. But the government ultimately had to modify
the pay structure partially at the implementation stage and merged grade VI
with grade VII in order to remove the discontentment of certain officials
(particularly at the district level) and raised their salaries to a
satisfactory stage. This was how the recommendations of the P & SC were
adopted in July 1977, and since then it has been in operation with occasional
revisions in order to cope with market conditions and inflation.
Another notable feature of the regime of General Zia was the
introduction of Swanirvar Gram Sarkar (SGS) at the village level. With a view
to instituting it at the village, the Swanirvar Gram Sarkar Act was passed in
1980. Under this act the SGS consisted of one Gram Pradhan (village headman),
two female members, and 9 other members representing different groups in the
village. Gram pradhan and other members were chosen in a meeting on the basis
of the consensus evolved among the village residents whose names appeared on
the village electoral roll. It was called upon to perform four major functions:
increase food production, eradicate illiteracy, implement family planning
programmes and maintain law and order. However, the SGS was not empowered to
collect funds to discharge its responsibilities. The SGS was pampered to such
an extent that it considered itself only next to the national government in
importance. But functionally it proved to be an utter failure because of
people's indifference and inherent organic problems of the SGS itself. The army
chief General H M Ershad abolished this institution after he took over the
civil government in 1982.
Immediately after assuming state authority General Ershad
concentrated on administrative reforms and appointed two major committees,
namely the Martial Law Committee (MLC) and the committee
for administrative reform/reorganisation (CARR). The MLC was
entrusted with the responsibility of examining organisational set-ups of
ministries/divisions and the departments/offices under them and to recommend
measures to improve efficiency in the civil services. The MLC suggested drastic
measures to quicken the decision-making process in the secretariat. The
recommendations put forward by the MLC included reduction in the number of
ministries/ divisions and civil servants mostly at lower levels; a scaling down
in the layers of decision making at the secretarial level; restructuring the
role of the secretariat and other executive organizations; formalization and
regularization of the recruitment process and delegation of financial and
administrative powers down the hierarchy.
The recommendations of the MLC were accepted by the military
government. The exception was the recommendation to reduce the layers of
decision making of the national secretariat. The CARR was entrusted with the
responsibility of recommending an appropriate, sound and effective
administrative system based on devolution of authority and people's
participation. The recommendations of CARR included a directly elected chief
executive (chairman) and a representative council (parishad) at each successive
local level i.e. zila, upazila and union with an elected chairman as the chief
coordinator with adequate staff support; elected councils at each level with
full functional control over the officials working for them; adequate
devolution of administrative, judicial and financial powers at zila and upazila
levels; elimination of sub-divisions and divisions as tiers of administration;
appointment of elected chairman of lower councils as ex-officio members of
immediate higher councils; and the development of an infrastructure at the upazila
level. General Ershad constituted another committee to suggest ways and means
for implementing the recommendations of the CARR, ie, the national
implementation committee for administrative reform/reorganization
(NICARR). The implementation of the NICARR recommendations resulted in the
creation of upazila administration at the local level.
The upazila administration was run by the Upazila Parishad
headed by a chairman directly elected by the voters of the upazila. The
parishad consisted of a chairman, representative members, women members,
official members, chairman of the upazila central cooperative association, and
nominated members. It comprised two categories of members, voting members and
non-voting official members. The parishad was made the focal point for all
administrative and development activities. The main function of the parishad
was to prepare the upazila development plan covering major activities such as
agriculture, education, health, communication, etc.
The parishad also implemented government policies and
programmes at the upazila level and performed other functions entrusted to it
from time to time by the government. It had also the responsibility to
coordinate the activities of all union parishads and paurashavas within the
upazila. Functionally, the upazila parishad was found to be a 'house divided
against itself' because of the conflict between the two categories of
functionaries, officials and public representatives. Nevertheless,
implementation of the CARR recommendations paved the way for popular
participation through delegation of authority and power to local units of
government. For the first time in the history of local government, members of
the central bureaucracy were replaced by elected chairmen in the local
councils.
The ascendance of the bangladesh
nationalist party (BNP) to power in 1991 led to the scrapping of the
upazila system on the ground that it had not attained noticeable progress in
the socio-economic sector, because of its functionaries' indulgence in the
misuse of money, corruption and unproductive expenditures. The government of
Khaleda Zia constituted a commission to conduct a fresh inquiry into the state of
local government, and to recommend measures consistent with the spirit of the
constitutional provisions specified in Articles 59 and 60 so that local
government and democracy could be institutionalised from the grassroots level.
In order to translate the objectives of the government, the commission
recommended reorganization of the union parishad and the zila parishad.
The commission also recommended making the municipalities
and city corporations more representative in the urban areas. It wanted the village
to be the fundamental unit of local government. Accordingly, a gramshava
(village assembly) was to comprise 10 members elected directly by the people of
a village whose names appeared in the electoral roll. In the reorganised system
the union was considered to be the focal point of socio-economic planning, and
the village the fundamental unit of development. Before this reform measure was
put into implementation, however, the government of Khaleda Zia had to step
down following a political turmoil. During BNP rule, a number of reports on
public administration were produced. The more important among these are the Public
Administration Efficiency Study by the UNDP, Towards Better Government
by four secretaries and Government that Works by the World Bank. None of
the recommendations of these reports has so far been implemented.
Awami League staged a comeback to power in 1996. This
government appointed a commission to reorganise the local government system of
the country. The commission suggested a four-tier local government, namely gram
parishad, union parishad, thana parishad and zila parishad. To strengthen the
local government system, the commission stressed the need for creating a
permanent local government commission, independent of the executive control, to
supervise, review, control and monitor functions of the local government units
and to suggest appropriate measures. The Awami League government also set up a
public administration reforms commission to deal with the problems faced by the
central government. However, it has not come up with any report till now.
During the
thirty years since independence there have been some reforms in the central
administration. But reform at the local level has been in real doldrums owing
to continuous experiments after every change of government. The real issues of
development, people's participation and devolution of authority in particular,
seem to have been lost in the political motive of establishing one's own
support-base and in destroying the support-base of predecessors.
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